The problems have been found to exist in an approach reflective of double standards among the various states with whom the EU seeks to restructure, gaps in the definition of human rights, ambiguous objectives and flaws with respect to the intensity of the reward system for compliance with the human rights objectives. This paper will examine specific human rights conditionality missions and the underlying problems that are associated with their ineffectiveness. The academic debate on the effectiveness of human rights conditionality policies of the EU will be the primary focus of this research. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel describe democratic conditionality as the core strategy of international organizations to induce non-member states to adheres to its principle of statehood.4 Blockmans and Lazowski takes a more simplistic approach to conditionality and describes it as a carrot and stick mechanism.5 The EU for example, makes provisions for the expansion of economic opportunities by virtue of integration into its markets and at the same time puts pressure on the recipient of these economic incentives in exchange for democracy and integration in European-level political institutions.6 Rich describes political conditionality as official development assistance.7 Its origins can be traced back to the post-World War II Marshall Plan implemented by the US. The Marshall Plan involved approximately $US 13 billion in the reconstruction of a war-torn Europe’s infrastructure, governance,and policies.