In the article titled from Chance to Choice, Buchanan et al. discuss the issue of whether utilizing germ line choice to eliminate disabilities is immoral since it will yield to harm to disabled people. The first objection centers on sweeping empirical generalization detailing that as the number of persons with a particular disability reduce, support for the individuals will decrease (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, Wilker, 2000). Second, the decision on whether the support will reduce within a certain case will hinge on a number of factors. The prediction on whether support will reduce as science reduces the occurrence of genetic diseases is much less reasonable today than it would have been two decades ago. This disregards the possibility that those who may not be disabled can possess legitimate interests in minimizing the rate of disabilities (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, Wilker, 2000).The interest that individuals have in not having disabilities can be regarded as morally legitimate. however, in some instances, the interest may be irrelevant since the disability can be averted only by safeguarding the existence of the individual who might be born with the disability. The incidence of genetically based diseases may be minimized devoid of preventing the birth of individuals who might have disabilities. Hence, an argument on the loss of support must be rejected as it fails to award any weight to the legitimate interests that individuals possess in averting disabilities. Buchanan et al. (2000) make a distinction between being harmed and being wrongly harmed. Furthermore, the loss of support argument is exclusionary, which render it flawed since it considers only a section of a legitimate interest at stake and award no weight to the legitimate interests that individuals have in not having disabilities (Sherlock Morrey, 2002).